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1. Introduction 
 
The interplay between economic and political factors suggests a role for public policies 
mainly on the side of redistribution through taxation and government spending. Focusing 
on taxation, political economy literature (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Besley and 
Coates, 1997) suggests that tax structure is portrayed as the voting outcome in elections 
with office motivated parties who seek the support of the median voter. In all these 
models, capital income is more concentrated than labor income and the median voter 
gains from shifting a large share of the tax burden to capital. This result becomes stronger 
the lower median income is relative to mean income (i.e. the higher is the income 
inequality). 
The relationship between income inequality and redistribution has been extensively 
investigated by a large number of empirical studies (see e.g. Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Perotti, 1996; Milanovic, 2000; Karabarbounis, 2011).1 
Most of these studies place the spotlight on total government spending or on specific 
spending accounts (e.g. social transfers as a share of GDP) and examine the effect of 
income inequality on the size of government spending. However, to the best of our 
knowledge there is not any empirical study examining the impact of income inequality on 
the structure of taxation and the relative tax burden between labor and capital.2  
In this paper, we seek to examine the impact of income inequality on the structure of 
tax policies and whether this effect is affected by the political regime type (i.e. the degree 
of democracy) within each country.3 To this end, we develop a simple theoretical model 
                                                 
1 See Borck (2007) for an excellent review of the literature investigating the impact of income inequality on 
redistribution.  
2 Perotti (1996) investigates the effect of middle class income share on marginal tax rate but fails to provide 
a robust relationship whereas Karabarbounis (2011), using a sample of OECD countries, provides evidence 
that a higher ratio of the gross earnings of the rich (resp. poor) to mean gross earnings is associated with 
lower (resp. higher) personal income taxes. However, both of these studies examine mainly the effect of 
income inequality on redistribution through government spending and thereby refraining from examining 
the impact of inequality on the structure of tax policies.  
3 A small but growing number of empirical studies examine the effect of democracy on the size of total tax 
revenues and the composition of taxation (see e.g. Aidt and Jensen, 2009; Boix, 2001; 2003; Kenny and 
Winner, 2006; Mulligan et al., 2004; Profeta et al. 2012). The theoretical argument behind the potential 
impact of democracy on tax policies goes as follows. An extension of the voting franchise increases the 
number of low-income voters and consequently changes the position of the median voter and the 
preferences of the electorate concerning redistribution. This implies: (i) an increase in total tax revenues 
and (ii) a shift of the tax policies away from the preferences of the rich (i.e. an increase (resp. decrease) on 
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that allows us to formalize the testable implications of the relevant theoretical literature. 
Then, in the empirical section, we investigate the above mentioned relationship. 
Concerning the data on tax policies, we  employ the high quality data on effective tax 
rates developed by Djankov et al. (2010) which provide us detailed measures of the tax 
burden fallen on labor and capital for a world sample of 85 countries. This dataset allows 
us to employ effective income tax rates for both developed and developing countries and 
thus gives us the opportunity to examine the impact of inequality on the structure of 
taxation in countries exhibiting substantial differences in terms of institutional quality 
and political environment. Concerning the data on income inequality, we employ various 
alternative economic inequality measures. More precisely, we employ: (i) the Gini 
coefficient of Texas University Inequality Project (2005), (ii) the Gini coefficient 
developed by Solt (2009) and (iii) the Deininger and Squire (1996) Gini coefficient 
obtained from the World Bank. 
An important issue raised by numerous scholars (see e.g. Piketty and Saez, 2007; 
Poterba, 2007) is the potential reverse causation between taxation and economic 
inequality that may generate an endogeneity problem in the relationship under 
consideration. According to this rationale, lower degrees of economic inequality may be 
the contemporaneous result of a more redistributive tax structure (i.e. a tax structure 
imposing larger tax burdens on capital relative to labor) rather than solely the cause of it. 
Our analysis places the spotlight on the potential reverse causality issue and seeks to 
address it by making use of the most appropriate data and techniques. First, we employ 
the most accurate data available. Namely, we use the Djankov et al. (2010) tax data 
which come from experts’ surveys on national tax legislation. Since these tax data are 
experts’ calculations of taxes applicable to a standardized enterprise, instead of realized 
tax rates we can assume that changes in taxation come as a result of changes in income 
inequality rather than being the cause of it.4 This is because these tax data are constructed 
                                                                                                                                                 
direct taxation (resp. indirect taxation)). However, the relevant empirical literature delivers contradicting 
findings.  Aidt et al. (2006) and Boix (2001; 2003) provide empirical evidence of a positive relationship 
between voting franchise and total tax revenues, whereas Aidt and Jensen (2009) and Kenny and Winner 
(2006) report a positive and significant effect of democracy on direct -relative to indirect- tax burden. In 
contrast, Mulligan et al. (2004) and Profeta et al. (2012) fail to establish a robust relationship between 
democratic institutions (i.e. degree of democracy and civil liberties) and implemented tax policies.  
4 We note that Djankov et al (2010) dataset of taxes has been constructed –jointly by Pricewatehouse 
Coopers accountants and tax lawyers-by computing of all relevant taxes applicable to the same 
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to reflect the relevant tax legislation and therefore are exogenous to the general economic 
conditions and to any indirect channel that may affect the realized tax policy. Moreover, 
concerning the economic inequality data, we choose to rely mainly on pre-tax-and 
transfers Gini coefficients instead of post-tax-and-transfers Gini. This decision mitigates 
somewhat the reverse causality problem since post-tax-and-transfers Gini vary 
“mechanically” and “economically” with the fiscal system whereas pre-tax-and transfers 
Gini coefficients vary solely through the endogenous responses of labor supply or the 
general equilibrium effect on factor prices (see e.g. Poterba, 2007). Third, we employ 
measures of inequality of former periods as explanatory of the tax structure in the year 
2004. More precisely we employ average of Gini coefficients over the period 1980-2002 
as regressors on the estimations of the tax structure in 2004. Last, a part of our analysis 
relies on Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation techniques.  
In sum, our results provide evidence of a positive and strong association between 
income inequality and capital taxation. On the other hand, our results suggest a negative 
and robust association between income inequality and (i) labor taxation, (ii) the ratio of 
labor to capital relative tax burden. Therefore, we conclude that economies characterized 
by higher income inequality choose to rely heavier on capital relative to labor taxation. 
This relationship remains robust through various alternative measures of income 
inequality and most importantly through alternative political regimes. In other words, our 
analysis fails to establish a clear cut result concerning the effect of the political regime 
type (i.e. the degree and the quality of democracy within each country) on the 
relationship between income inequality and tax composition.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows; in Section 2, we present the theoretical 
considerations upon which we base our empirical analysis on; in Section 3, we discuss 
the empirical methodology and the data; in Section 4 we present the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
standardized domestic enterprise called TaxpayerCo, operating in each country. TaxpayerCo is a taxable 
corporation operating in the most populous city in the country. It is liable for taxes charged at the local, 
state/provincial and national levels. In many instances, these rates differ sharply from statutory tax rates.  
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This section elaborates on the theoretical link between income inequality and tax policies 
so as to formalize testable empirical implications of the relevant theoretical literature. We 
present a simple model which explains how the tax structure (i.e. tax burden on labor and 
capital) is determined. This is simplified extension of the Persson and Tabellini (2000) 
model that allows us to highlight the effect of inequality on the relative tax burden of 
capital and labor on both democratic and non-democratic regimes.  
We have a two period economy, 1,2t =  where a single commodity is produced with a 
linear technology using only labour. We assume that policy choices are made by the 
government ahead of any (economic) choices made by the economic agents and that there 
is full commitment over these choices. The economy is populated by a continuum of 
consumers indexed by i. Consumers’ preferences over consumption in both periods itc , 
and leisure xi, are represented as follows: 
 
 1 2( ) ( )
i i i iu U c c V x= + +  (1) 
 
where U(.) and V(.) are twice differentiable with a positive first and negative second 
derivatives. In the first period, each individual is endowed with 1 ie−  units of wealth, 
which he can choose to consume at time 1t =  or store for consumption in the second 
period. We assume there is no storage cost, and the gross return to savings equals to 
unity. In the second period, the consumer has 1 ie+  units of time endowment, which can 
devoted either to labour, il , for a gross return (wage) equal to unity or to leisure.  This 
assumption about ie  implies that labour and wealth endowments are perfectly negatively 
correlated, and thus ie  shows whether individual i has relatively more labour or wealth 
endowment (since individuals differ only in one dimension). We also assume that ie  is 
distributed with a c.d.f. F(.) with mean 0e =  and median 0me > , i.e. the majority of the 
population has relatively more labour than wealth endowment. 
The government raises taxes on second period’s labour income and stored wealth, i.e. 
capital, using tax rates ( , )L Kτ τΤ = , in order to finance a given amount of (second 
period’s) government per capita consumption G.  
The above imply that the budget constraints for each consumer i are given by:  
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 1 1
i i ic k e+ = −      (2) 
 
 2 (1 ) (1 )
i i i
Lc k lτ τΚ= − + −    (3) 
 
where ik  is the amount of capital brought in second period by consumer i. It follows that 
the time constraint of each i can be written as: 
 
 1 i i ie l x+ = +    (4) 
 
Maximization of (1) subject to the constraints (2), (3) and (4) with respect to il  and ik  
yields the labour and capital supply functions:  
 
 ( )i iLl L eτ= +   (5) 
 
 ( )i iKk K eτ= −    (6) 
 
where L(τL), K(τK) are the labour and capital supply functions of the average individual 
(i.e. e=0).  
Given economic agents’ choices, the government chooses the vector of tax 
rates ( , )L Kτ τΤ = . Furthermore, in order to model the behaviour of the government in a 
more general way and under alternative political regimes, we follow Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2006) and assume that government choices result from the maximization of a 
general social welfare function5:  
 
 ( , ) (1 ) ( , )m rL K L KW V Vλ τ τ λ τ τ= + −   (7) 
                                                 
5 The maximization of a weighted social welfare function as the goal of a government can be given several 
microfoundations in the public choice literature. For example the standard probabilistic voting model 
(Hinich, 1977; Hinich and Munger, 1994) is equivalent to maximization of a weighted social welfare 
function as in equation (7). Similarly the maximization of a social welfare function as a goal of the 
government can be also derived in general lobbying models (e.g. Coughlin et al., 1990; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994). More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have shown that in a model with non-
democratic politics, the threat of revolution against the elite, equilibrium policies are those that maximize a 
weighted sum of the indirect utilities of the citizens and the elite.   
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where ( , )m L KV τ τ  is the indirect utility of the individual with the median ability and 
( , )r L KV τ τ is the indirect utility of the group of individuals that hold enough political 
power to affect government choices. Therefore, λ captures the influence of the median 
voter relative to other groups of agents, on government decisions. If 1λ =  the objective 
function of the government is exclusively the welfare of the median voter. For λ<1, 
preferences of other minority groups, also matter in the political process. We, thus, 
conceive λ  to be the measure of the degree of democracy in a country.6 As λ  decreases 
the government cares less about the welfare of the median voter and more about the 
welfare of other groups of agents usually holding enough political power to guarantee the 
survival of the government.  
Inserting the labour and capital supply functions (5), (6) for each i into their budget 
constraints (2), (3) and then into the utility function (1), we get the indirect utility 
function for consumer i, which in turn is substituted into (7), to get:  
 
 ( , ) ( ) (1 )m rL K K LW w e eτ τ τ τ λ λ⎡ ⎤= + − + −⎣ ⎦  (8) 
 
Finally, the government’s budget constraint is given by: 
 
 ( ) ( )L L K KG Lτ τ τ τ= + Κ  (9) 
 
Equilibrium policy then is given by the maximization of (8) subject to the government’s 
budget constraint (9). This is a standard optimal taxation problem, which in equilibrium 
yields the following modified Ramsey rule: 
 
[ ] [ ]( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 )1 ( ) 1 ( )
( ) ( )
m r m r
K L
L L K K
K L
K e e L e e
K L
τ λ λ τ λ λε τ ε ττ τ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − + + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦+ = +  
(10) 
where ( )L Lε τ , ( )K Kε τ  are the elasticities of labour and capital supply respectively, with 
respect to the tax rates. Together with (9), this condition gives the equilibrium tax rates 
                                                 
6 In a more general setting, parameter λ can be viewed as a measure of the “quality of democracy”. 
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selected by the government. Furthermore, it can be used to discuss the main testable 
hypotheses of the empirical section.  
First, consider the effect of inequality. Departing from equilibrium, higher inequality 
implies lower em, (given that 0e = ) which in turn means smaller left hand side of (10) 
compared to the right hand side. Therefore, Kτ  should increase and Lτ  should decrease in 
order to restore the equilibrium.7 Equation (10) also reveals the effect of international 
market integration. Higher economic integration implies lower elasticities of capital and 
labor supply (as workers and capital can move between jurisdictions). As long as capital 
is more mobile than labor (see e.g. Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991; Persson and Tabellini, 
1992) the right hand side of (10) becomes bigger than left hand side. In order to restore 
the equilibrium Kτ  must fall and Lτ  must rise. 
Finally, from the modified Ramsey rule (10) we can also establish that as long as λ is 
not equal to zero, inequality (i.e. changes in the value of em relative to the average ability  
and er) will always affect the tax structure irrespective of the nature of the political 
regime.  Specifically, as long as 0λ > , higher inequality will always exert a positive 
(resp. negative) effect on the tax rate of capital (resp. labour).  
According to the political economics’ literature, there are strong theoretical reasons 
justifying that λ does not equal to one in democratic regimes and does not take the value 
of zero even in pure autocracies. This is because democratic politics may be affected by 
the presence of special interest groups (Coughlin, 1992), lobbying activities (Becker, 
1983) and partisan politics (Alesina, 1988) that lead national government to diverge from 
the preferences of the median voter. On contrary, the theoretical literature examining 
non-democratic regimes concludes that there are various constraints that increase the 
leader’s accountability even in the absence of elections (see e.g. Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Padro-i-Miguel, 2007; Besley and 
Kundamatsu, 2008).8 Thus, even in non-democracies the leader will cater for the wishes 
of the median voter –at some extent (i.e. 0λ > ). Summarizing the above, our theoretical 
                                                 
7 Given the assumption about V(.) and U(.), the eleasticities of labor and capital supplies are negative 
functions of the respective tax rates. 
8 The examination of leaders’ accountability in the absence of elections dates back -at least- to McGuire 
and Olson (1996) “stationary bandits” theory. More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) establish a 
“revolution constraint” mechanism that serves as constraint for non-democratic leaders.  
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framework predicts small (if any) differences on the effects of the independent variables 
on the structure of the tax rates between democracies and non-democracies.  
We note that the effect of λ on the structure of taxation is a- priori ambiguous as it 
depends on the relative position of er. Therefore, the effect of democracy on the tax 
structure can be positive or negative.  
 
3. Empirical Specification and Data. 
 
In this section, we primarily examine the effect of income inequality on the structure of 
taxation. Then, we investigate whether this relationship is affected by the political regime 
and the quality of democracy within each country.  
 
3.1 Econometric Model 
 
The baseline specification used to study the relationship between income inequality and 
tax structure has the following form: 
 
0 1  i i k i i iTaxRate Gini controls geographical dummies uα β β= + + + +    (11) 
 
where tax policy in country i, is expressed as a function of income inequality, a set of 
control variables, geographical dummies and a stochastic term ui. The dependent variable 
in equation (11) is the labor or/to the capital employing the data developed by Djankov et 
al. (2010). We build a cross section dataset of 75 -developed and developing- countries. 
The dependent and explanatory variables are discussed below. Explicit definitions, 
descriptive statistics and sources of the variables employed are provided in Appendix A.   
 
 
3.2 The Data 
 
3.2.1 Data on tax rates  
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Statutory tax rates in capital and labor can neither capture the complexity of the tax 
system nor provide a clear indicator of the implied tax policy. This is because the overall 
tax burden fallen on capital and on labor does not depend solely on the relevant statutory 
tax rates, but also on what is defined - by the tax legislation - as the tax base. Therefore, 
we are in need of more elaborate tax measures that take into account changes in the tax 
base (e.g. changes in deductions and exemptions, depreciation allowances). Previous 
empirical studies focusing on tax policies seek to overcome this problem by employing 
effective average tax ratios, based on the methodology developed by Mendoza et al. 
(1994). Our empirical analysis relies on the tax data developed by Djankov et al. (2010).  
The main advantage of the Djankov et al. (2010) tax dataset is that it has been 
constructed -in cooperation with PricewaterhouseCoopers accountants and tax lawyers- 
by using a hypothetical standardized enterprise. More precisely, Djankov et al. (2010) 
assume the existence of a hypothetical enterprise with specific characteristics (e.g. 
industrial and commercial activities, number of employers, assets, liabilities etc.) and 
then asked from the PricewaterhouseCoopers experts to calculate the taxes that this 
enterprise would pay in different countries according to the relevant national tax 
legislation.9 Since these tax data are experts’ calculations of taxes applicable to a 
standardized enterprise, instead of realized tax rates, we can assume that changes in 
taxation come as a result of changes in economic variables (such as economic growth, 
economic inequality) rather than being the cause of them. This latter characteristic 
appears to be in great importance for addressing the potential problem of reverse 
causality between taxation and economic inequality referred by a large number of 
scholars (see e.g. Piketty and Saez, 2007; Poterba, 2007).  
Concerning the tax rates data, our analysis relies on the corporate tax rates measures -
developed by Djankov et al (2010) following the methodology described above- as well 
as one labor tax. More precisely, we employ: (i) the effective corporate tax rate (denoted 
as capital tax rate) which is the actual first year corporate tax liability of the hypothetical 
standardized enterprise relative to pre-tax earnings, taking into account all available 
deductions, (ii) the labor tax rate (denoted as labor tax rate) which is the sum of all labor-
                                                 
9 For more details about the characteristics of this hypothetical standardized enterprise see Djankov et al 
.(2010). 
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related taxes payable by the hypothetical firm including payroll taxes, mandatory social 
security contributions, mandatory health insurance relative to pre-tax earnings  and (iii) 
the ratio of labor to capital tax rate (Ratio labor to capital tax). 10 
 
3.2.2 Data on income inequality  
In order to control for income inequality, we rely on three alternative inequality databases 
and we employ four alternative measures of Gini coefficients. Our benchmark inequality 
variable, which is employed in most of the specifications, is the Gini coefficient 
developed by the Texas University Inequality Project [TUIP] (2003) (denoted as 
Gini_Texas). The basic advantage of the Gini_Texas indicator is that it is a pre-tax-and 
transfers Gini measure and therefore is not expected to vary “mechanically” with the tax 
policies. This characteristic is important since it mitigates the potential reverse causality 
problem in the relationship under examination.11  
In order to inquire into the robustness of our baseline results we also employ three 
alternative inequality proxies. Namely, we employ: (i) the pre-tax-and-transfers Gini 
coefficient developed by Solt (2009) (denoted as GiniSolt_market), (ii) the post- tax-and-
transfers Gini coefficient developed by Solt (2009) (denoted as Gini_Solt) and (iii) the 
Deininger and Squire (1996) Gini coefficient obtained from the World Banks’ World 
Development Indicators (2010) (denoted as Gini_DS). All the alternative inequality 
measures are averages over the period 1980-2002. 
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
To ensure robust econometric identification, we use a number of control variables in the 
estimated equations. In order to be consistent with the relevant literature, our core set of 
controls is identical to that employed by the pioneering work of Mulligan et al. (2004) 
which examines the effect of democracy on implemented fiscal policy.  
More precisely, we control for the overall level of productivity and wealth in the 
economy by employing real GDP per capita (denoted as gdp_percapita). Data for this 
                                                 
10 For more details on tax variables methodology and definitions see Djankov et al (2010). 
11 We note pre-tax-and transfers Gini coefficients vary solely through the endogenous responses of labor 
supply or the general equilibrium effect on factor prices (see e.g. Poterba, 2007) whereas post-tax-and-
transfers Gini coefficients vary - by construction- “mechanically” with the implemented tax policies.  
 11
variable originates from the World Banks’ World Development Indicators (WDI) (2010). 
In addition, we account for the presence of economies of scale in the public good 
provision at the country level by controlling for (i) total population (population) obtained 
by WDI (2010) and (ii) ethno-linguistic fractionalization by employing the Alesina et al. 
(2003) data on ethnic (denoted as ethnic) and linguistic fractionalization (language). 
Higher values of population and lower values on ethnic and language imply larger 
economies of scale, lower per capita cost of public good and consequently lower levels of 
taxation (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998).  
In order to control for demographic characteristics we use the proportion of 
population above 65 years old (denoted as old). old is a standard demographic variable 
that is expected to exert a positive impact on tax rates since higher proportion of the 
economically dependent population generates fiscal needs which in turn increase tax 
rates. Finally, we employ openness to account for international market integration. 
According to the tax competition theory (see e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986;  
Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991) more integrated economies tend to rely heavier on the 
taxation of labor relative to capital, since the former appears to be relatively immobile 
factor of production. Thus, openness is expected to be positively (resp. negatively) 
related with labor (resp. capital) tax rates.12  
 
4. Estimation and Results 
 
4.1 The effect of income inequality on the structure of taxation: Baseline Results 
We start by estimating equation (11) presented in section 3.1, using the data and the 
empirical methodology outlined in the previous section. The results are reported in Table 
1.  
[Table 1, here] 
 
                                                 
12 According to the benchmark tax competition model (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986) tax competition 
among different regions leads to suboptimally low capital tax rates and to an inefficiently low level of 
public goods. Allowing for a second tax instrument (i.e. a labor tax), the local governments find it optimal 
to rely more on labor taxation to finance the public good (see e.g. Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991; Persson 
and Tabellini, 1993).  
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In columns (1) to (4), Capital Tax Rate is regressed on Gini_Texas as well as on a set of 
control variables identical to that employed by Mulligan et al. (2004) (i.e. gdp_percapita, 
openness, government spending, democracy, ethnic, population,  old, legor_uk and 
language). All regressions are estimated with regional dummies and robust standard 
errors.  The set of regional dummies includes a fixed effect for East Asia (AsiaE), North 
America (NAm), Sub-Sahara Africa (SubAfr) and Asia and Middle Africa (AsiaMAfr).  
Clearly, Gini_Texas bears a positive and highly significant coefficient which remains 
qualitatively intact in all alternative specifications. This result indicates that economies 
characterized by higher income inequality rely heavier on capital taxation. This finding 
appears to be in accordance with the testable hypothesis driven by our theoretical model. 
As far as the rest of the explanatory variables are concerned, we observe that 
gdppercapita bear positive and significant coefficients indicating that richer countries 
tend to increase the tax burden fallen on capital whereas openness enters with a negative 
and significant coefficient highlighting the negative effect of international market 
integration on capital taxation. This result is in line with the theory of international tax 
competition (see e.g. Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991; Persson and Tabellini, 1992) as well 
as previous empirical studies examining the effect of globalization on capital taxation 
(see e.g. Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Adam and Kammas, 2007).13  
In columns (5) to (8) the dependent variable is Labor Tax Rate developed by Djankov 
et al. (2010) whereas in columns (9) to (12) the dependent variable is the ratio of labor to 
capital tax rate (denoted as Ratio labor to capital tax) which captures the tax burden 
fallen on labor relative to capital.  These two variables are regressed on Gini_Texas as 
well as on the standard set of explanatory variables and regional dummies. All 
regressions are again estimated with robust standard errors.    
As can be seen, in columns (5) to (12) Gini_Texas enters with a negative and 
significant coefficient which remains robust in all alternative specifications. The negative 
coefficient of Gini_Texas on Labor Tax Rate (see columns (5) to (8)) highlights the 
negative effect of increased income inequality on the tax burden fallen on labor whereas 
the negative coefficient Gini_Texas on Ratio labor to capital tax (see columns (9) to 
                                                 
13 For an excellent survey on international tax competition literature see Leibrecht and Hochgatterer (2012) 
and for a meta-analysis of the relevant empirical studies see Adam et al. (2013). 
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(12)) indicates that economies characterized by higher income inequality tend to rely 
heavier on labor relative to capital taxation. These findings appear to be in clear cur 
agreement with the implications driven by the theoretical model presented in Section 2. 
Concerning the rest of the explanatory variables, we observe that gdp_percapita 
enters with a negative and significant coefficients indicating that richer countries tend to 
decrease the tax burden fallen on labor (see columns (5) to (8)) and to rely lighter on 
labor taxation relatively to capital taxation (see columns (9) to (12)). In contrast, 
openness bears a positive coefficient which appears to be significant in most of the 
specifications. The positive impact of international market integration on the ratio of 
labor to capital tax rate is in line with the theory of international tax competition which 
suggests that increased globalization leads to a transfer of the tax burden from the 
internationally mobile factor of production (i.e. capital) to the relative immobile (i.e. 
labor) (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1992). Moreover, this result is also in accordance 
with previous empirical studies examining the impact of globalization on the structure of 
taxation (see e.g. Bretschger and Hettich, 2002; Adam and Kammas, 2007). Finally, we 
note that legor_uk enters with a negative and highly significant coefficient indicating that 
the countries characterized by British legal origin (common law countries) tend to rely 
lighter on labor taxation compared to the non-British law origin countries.  
 
4.2 The effect of income inequality on the structure of taxation: Sensitivity Analysis 
In Tables 2a and 2b, we inquire into the robustness of our baseline results by 
investigating whether the effect of income inequality on the structure of taxation survives 
under alternative measures of inequality as well as under alternative estimation 
techniques. 
[Table 2a here] 
 
In Table 2a we re-estimate the benchmark regression sing alternative proxies for income 
inequality. Namely, in columns (1) to (3) we employ the Gini coefficient –before taxes 
and transfers- developed by Solt (2009) [denoted as GiniSolt_market],  in columns (4) to 
(6) the Gini coefficient –after taxes and transfers- developed by Solt (2009) [denoted as 
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Gini_Solt] and in columns (7) to (9) the Deininger and Squire (1996) Gini coefficient 
[denoted as Gini_DS].14 
Again, all alternative inequality measures bear positive and significant coefficients on 
the equations related to capital taxation and negative and significant coefficients in 
equations related to (i) labor and (ii) ratio of labor to capital taxation. Therefore, we 
conclude that our baseline empirical findings remain robust under different income 
inequality measures. In other words, countries characterized by higher inequality tend to 
rely heavier on capital taxation whereas at the same time decrease the tax burden fallen 
on labor. The parameter estimates on the remaining explanatory variables are largely 
unchanged. 
 
[Table 2b here] 
 
In Table 2b, we further investigate the robustness of our baseline results by examining 
whether the effect of income inequality on the structure of taxation survives under 
alternative estimation techniques. To this end, in columns (1) to (3) we repeat our 
benchmark estimation keeping intact the set of the controls and excluding solely the 
regional dummies. As can be easily verified our empirical findings remain qualitatively 
intact.  
Next, in columns (4) to (6), in Table 2b, we examine the robustness of our results by 
checking whether these are driven by individual outliers and by applying robust 
regression techniques. As our sample consists of many heterogeneous countries another 
potential source of worry may be the presence of outliers in the sample. Outliers are 
observations that lie outside the typical relationship between the dependent and 
explanatory variables determined by the rest of the observations (Barnett and Lewis, 
1994; De Haan, 2007). The standard practice is dropping observations identified as 
outliers through the residuals of the OLS estimation. However this may in fact be 
inappropriate: outliers in the space of the explanatory variables (i.e. “good leverage 
points”, Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987) are not detected by this method. In order to deal 
                                                 
14 Note that GiniSolt_market is a Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers and therefore is more closely 
related to the Gini_Texas measure which is employed as the benchmark. On the other hand, Gini_Solt and 
Gini_DS both consists Gini coefficients after taxes and transfers. 
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with this issue we apply robust regression techniques. Specifically, we employ the MM- 
estimator (Yohai, 1987). Following Rousseeuw and Yohai (1987), this class of estimators 
instead of minimizing the variance of the residuals (as the OLS does) minimizes 
measures of dispersion of the residuals that are less sensitive to outliers. As can be seen 
[columns (4) to (6), in Table 2b] our empirical findings remain highly robust under robust 
regression techniques.  
We have already noted the potential reverse causality problem between income 
inequality and the structure of taxation. This is because lower degrees of economic 
inequality may be the contemporaneous result of a more redistributive tax structure rather 
than solely the cause of it (see e.g. Piketty and Saez, 2007; Poterba, 2007).  
In our baseline estimations, we have chosen to address the reverse causality problem, 
by employing the Gini_Texas as the income inequality measure, which is a pre-tax-and-
transfers- Gini coefficient. Moreover, we have chosen to employ Gini measures which 
are averages over the period 1980-2002 whereas our dependent variables are tax data 
from the fiscal year 2004.  
In columns (7) to (9), in Table 2b, we treat the potential reverse causality problem by 
employing an instrumental variables approach. Three obvious choices for instrumenting 
income inequality are: (i) the primary, (ii) the secondary and (iii) the tertiary gross school 
enrollment ratios (taken from the World Bank), expressed as the percentage of the 
population of official education age. Education is expected to affect income inequality 
(see e.g. Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985) whereas, at the same time, gross school 
enrollment ratios are not expected to be associated with the structure of taxation. 15 We 
report the results in Columns (7) to (9). The estimation method is two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) with geographical dummies and robust standard errors. First stage results (not 
reported in the Table) indicate that our instruments are significant determinants of income 
inequality. The good fit of the instruments is also confirmed by the Hansen J over-
                                                 
15 For a survey on the effect of education on income inequality see Psacharopoulos and Woodhall (1985, 
pp. 264-70); and Ram (1989). Becker and Chiswick (1966) show that, across regions in the US, income 
inequality is negatively correlated with the average level of schooling. Chiswick (1971) suggests that 
earnings inequality increases with educational inequality. Gregorio and Lee (2002) argue that income 
distribution is closely related to people’s average years of school attained and its distribution. Additional 
empirical works among others that find relationship between schooling and income inequality are Ram 
(1990), Park (1996) and Thomas et al. (2003). 
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identification test (i.e. that the over-identification restrictions are valid).16 As can be 
verified our empirical findings remain qualitatively intact. Gini_Texas enters with a 
positive and significant coefficient in the estimation of Capital tax rate whereas bears a 
negative and significant coefficient in the estimations of both the (i) Labor tax rate and 
(ii) the Ratio of labor to capital tax. Concerning the rest of the explanatory variables, our 
results remain similar to those presented in the previous tables. 
 
4.3 The effect of the democracy on the nexus between income inequality and the structure 
of taxation 
 
In this sub-section we place the spotlight on the potential differential effect of the 
democracy on the nexus between income inequality and the structure of taxation. To 
identify this channel we estimate the following equation: 
 
0 1 2 3 *
                                                                                               
i i i i i k i
i i
TaxRate Gini Democracy Gini Democracy controls
geographical dummies u
α β β β β= + + + + +
+ +      (12) 
 
Specifically; we introduce a variable capturing the political regime type (Democracy) and 
an interaction term (Gini*Democracy). To allow interpreting the impact of β1 and β2 at 
their mean values, we mean-center the corresponding variables and compute the 
multiplicative term of the transformed variables.17  
Specifically, we introduce the multiplicative variables: (i) Gini_Texas_dif* 
Democracy_dif [see columns (1) to (3) in Table3], (ii) Gini_Texas_dif* Rule_Law_dif 
[see columns (4) to (6)], and (iii) Gini_Texas_dif*Accountability_dif  [see columns (4) to 
(6)]. The variable Gini_Texas_dif  is the mean-centered of the Gini_Texas. Similarly, 
Democracy_dif is the mean-centered of the democracy measure developed by Polity IV 
(2004) database with higher values denoting more democratic regimes. Finally, the 
                                                 
16 For more details on these issues see Baum et al. (2007). 
17 By taking differences from the mean (mean-centered variables), we avoid the potential problem of 
multicollinearity between the constitutive terms and the interaction term, whereas our results do not change 
qualitatively. 
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Rule_Law_dif and the Accountability_dif are the mean-centered measures of the “Rule of 
Law” and “Voice and Accountability” variables developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010).18 
By introducing these interaction terms we allow the effect of Gini_Texas to vary 
across countries characterized by different political regimes. According to our theoretical 
priors the degree of democracy is not expected to affect the relationship between income 
inequality and the composition of taxation. Thus, we anticipate a statistically insignificant 
coefficient in all these interaction terms.  
 
[Table 3, here] 
 
The results indicate that all three alternative interaction terms (i.e. 
Gini_Texas_dif*Democracy_dif,  Gini_Texas_dif* Rule_Law_dif  and  Gini_Texas_dif* 
Accountability_dif ) bear statistically insignificant coefficients in all alternative 
specifications. These findings are in line with the implications driven by our theoretical 
model. Namely, the positive (resp. negative) effect of income inequality on the tax rate of 
capital (resp. the tax rate of labor) is not affected by the political regime type and the 
corresponding quality of democracy within each country.  
Our empirical findings appear to be in accordance (although not directly related) with 
the conclusions driven by the empirical studies of Mulligan et al. (2004) and Profeta et al. 
(2012) which also fail to establish a robust relationship between the degree of democracy 
and the composition of taxation. Specifically, Mulligan et al. (2004) shows that 
democracy does neither affect total tax revenue (as a share of GDP) nor corporate tax 
rates. Similarly, the analysis of Profeta et al. (2012) fails to provide evidence of a 
significant relationship between democratic institutions and implemented tax policies -
when controlling for country fixed effects. Therefore, our analysis contributes to the 
existing literature by highlighting that income inequality is the major driving force behind 
the design of the tax system despite the degree and the quality of democracy within each 
country.  
                                                 
18 According to Kaufmann et al. (2010) Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Voice and accountability 
captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we specify a theoretical framework which allows us to investigate the effect 
of income inequality on the structure of tax policies and whether this effect depends on  
the political regime and the quality of democracy within each country. The analysis is 
carried out on a cross section dataset of 75 developed and developing countries. Backed 
by strong empirical results, obtained from several different specifications and sensitivity 
analyses, we contend that economies characterized by higher income inequality rely 
heavier on capital taxation whereas at the same time they tend to lessen the tax burden 
fallen on labor. This result is unaffected by the political regime type and the quality of 
democracy. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study that examines the relationship 
between income inequality and tax structure for a sample of developing and developed 
countries. Therefore, our findings contribute to the well established agenda studying the 
implemented fiscal policy in developing countries and examining potential differences 
between developing and developed countries concerning this issue (see e.g. Persson and 
Tabellini, 2003; Kenny and Winer, 2006; Keen and Lockwood, 2010). Moreover, our 
findings could also be related to the literature that examine the effects of alternative 
political regimes on implemented policies (see e.g. Aidt and Jensen 2009; Deacon, 2009; 
Mulligan et al., 2004; Profeta et al., 2012). Clearly, these findings and their potential 
policy implications call for a deeper understanding of the inter- and intra-country 
mechanisms that create this pattern and this is an issue definitely warrants future 
research. 
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Appendix A: Data sources and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Description 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min max Source 
Capital tax rate Effective (1 years) tax 
rate on capital. 
80 17.733 6.247 4.14 39.87 Djankov et al. (2010) 
Labor tax rate Labor tax rate 80 15.533 9.339 0.61 37.65 Djankov et al. (2010) 
Ratio(labor to 
capital tax) 
Ratio of labor tax to 
effective (1 year) tax 
rate on capital. 
80 1.157 1.158 0.027803 6.330918 Own calculations 
based on Djankov et 
al. (2010) 
Gini_Texas Gini coefficient 73 40.385 6.052 24.46 53.27 Texas University 
Inequality Project 
(2003) 
GiniSolt_market 
 
Gini coefficient (before 
taxes and transfers) 
80 43.610 7.068 29.38 66.12 Solt (2009) 
Gini_Solt 
 
 
Gini coefficient (after 
taxes and transfers) 
80 37.196 10.129 21.58 62.07 Solt (2009) 
Gini_DS 
 
 
Gini coefficient 76 38.496 9.202 21.61 58.93 World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
old 
 
Population ages 64 and 
above (% Total 
Population) 
80 28.613 3.652 18.45 37.28 World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
gdp_percapita 
 
GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 US$). 
80 7147.227 8965.816 141.34 32321.34 World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
population total population 80 7.244 0.589 6.3 9.06 World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
democracy Polity Democracy 
Index 
78 4.214 5.443 -7.2 10 Polity IV (2004) 
Database 
Rule_Law Rule of Law 80 0.250 0.940 -1.38 1.94 Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
Voice_Accountability Voice and 
Accountability 
80 0.296 0.858 -1.43 1.63 Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 
ethnic Ethnic 
Fractionalization. 
80 0.408 0.255 0 0.93 Alesina et al (2003) 
openness Imports plus Exports 
(%GDP) 
80 56.084 36.68362 15.07 293.33 World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
language Linguistic 
Fractionalization. 
80 0.352 0.288 0 0.92 Alesina et al (2003) 
legor_uk Dummy variable taking 
the value of one if a 
country has British 
Legal Origin 
77 0.285 0.454 0 1 La Porta et al. (2008) 
Public Spending Total Government 
Spending (%GDP) 
75 28.793 10.774 8.77 56.38 World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
 20
Prim_enrolment Gross school enrolment 
ratio. Primary.  
79 99.710 15.568 33.63 138.61 World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
Sec_enrolment Gross school enrolment 
ratio. Secondary. All 
programmes.  
79 73.246 31.379 5.04 149.73 World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
Tert_enrolment Gross school enrolment 
ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 
5 and 6).  
79 26.393 18.115 0.42 79.28 World Bank 
Development 
Indicators (2011) 
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Table1: The effect of income inequality on the tax structure. Baseline Results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Capital 
tax rate 
 
Capital 
tax rate 
 
Capital 
tax rate 
 
Capital 
tax rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Ratio 
labor to 
capital tax 
Ratio 
labor to 
capital tax 
Ratio labor 
to capital 
tax 
Ratio 
labor to 
capital tax 
Gini_Texas 0.568*** 0.459*** 0.453*** 0.456*** -0.782*** -0.797*** -0.732*** -0.447* -0.110*** -0.102*** -0.097*** -0.092*** 
 (3.621) (3.421) (3.552) (3.156) (-3.618) (-3.964) (-2.747) (-1.781) (-4.899) (-4.625) (-3.958) (-3.089) 
gdp_percapita 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001* -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (2.870) (2.391) (2.178) (2.663) (-2.307) (-1.468) (-1.773) (-2.041) (-3.865) (-2.544) (-2.953) (-2.584) 
openness  -0.065*** -0.055** -0.047*  -0.020 -0.002 0.077**  0.006* 0.009* 0.010** 
  (-3.685) (-2.582) (-1.967)  (-0.911) (-0.061) (2.538)  (1.859) (2.000) (2.172) 
democracy  0.246 0.240 0.271  -0.364 -0.083 0.248  0.015 0.050 0.053 
  (1.196) (0.959) (1.143)  (-1.346) (-0.282) (0.793)  (0.343) (0.934) (1.017) 
legor_uk   1.920 1.314   -7.262*** -9.544***   -0.792*** -0.872*** 
   (0.891) (0.596)   (-4.360) (-3.735)   (-3.151) (-2.855) 
Public Spending   -0.128 -0.083   0.040 0.171   0.011 0.008 
   (-1.438) (-0.860)   (0.285) (1.248)   (0.766) (0.417) 
old   0.374 0.348   -0.213 0.294   0.007 0.018 
   (1.077) (1.042)   (-0.489) (0.666)   (0.167) (0.359) 
population    1.604    8.546***    0.042 
    (0.928)    (3.390)    (0.133) 
Ethnic    5.225    0.008    -0.674 
    (1.119)    (0.001)    (-0.718) 
Language    -0.619    -2.838    0.506 
    (-0.142)    (-0.589)    (0.741) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
obs 75 73 67 67 75 73 67 67 74 73 67 67 
R2 0.17 0.37 0.44 0.46 0.38 0.40 0.48 0.60 0.37 0.41 0.50 0.51 
 
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions are estimated with regional dummies and robust standard errors (except otherwise noted). The 
set of regional dummies includes a fixed effect for East Asia (AsiaE), North America (NAm), Sub-Sahara Africa (SubAfr) and Asia and Middle Africa (AsiaMAfr). In Columns (1)-(4), the 
dependent variable is the Capital Tax Rate data developed by Djankov et al. (2010). In Columns (5)-(8) the dependent variables is the Labor Tax Rate data developed by Djankov et al. 
(2010). Finally, in Columns (9) and (12) the dependent variable is the Ratio of labor to capital tax. The *, ** and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.   
Table2a: The effect of income inequality on the tax structure. Sensitivity Analysis. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Capital 
tax rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Ratio 
(labor to 
capital tax) 
Capital 
tax rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Ratio 
(labor to 
capital tax) 
Capital 
tax rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Ratio 
(labor to 
capital tax) 
GiniSolt_market 0.236** -0.342** -0.061***       
 (2.329) (-2.655) (-3.591)       
Gini_Solt    0.253** -0.417*** -0.071***    
    (2.646) (-3.548) (-4.336)    
Gini_DS       0.221** -0.299** -0.065*** 
       (2.110) (-2.402) (-3.763) 
gdp_percapita 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (1.549) (-2.928) (-2.972) (1.915) (-3.734) (-3.365) (1.663) (-3.417) (-3.320) 
openness -0.058** 0.077*** 0.011*** -0.056** 0.073** 0.011*** -0.054** 0.076** 0.011*** 
 (-2.379) (2.693) (2.820) (-2.282) (2.579) (2.846) (-2.167) (2.499) (2.827) 
democracy 0.075 0.443* 0.090* 0.112 0.403* 0.081* 0.128 0.532** 0.103** 
 (0.376) (1.762) (1.868) (0.555) (1.763) (1.800) (0.613) (2.489) (2.109) 
legor_uk 2.589 -9.574*** -0.914*** 2.317 -8.950*** -0.800*** 3.145 -9.576*** -0.840*** 
 (1.103) (-4.136) (-3.047) (0.935) (-3.947) (-2.797) (1.177) (-3.945) (-2.708) 
Government spending -0.102 0.175 0.017 -0.059 0.102 0.004 -0.093 0.140 0.005 
 (-1.014) (1.397) (0.952) (-0.595) (0.800) (0.254) (-0.848) (1.065) (0.263) 
old 0.268 0.194 0.011 0.339 0.067 -0.015 0.336 0.190 0.000 
 (0.715) (0.510) (0.218) (0.886) (0.183) (-0.339) (0.906) (0.493) (0.005) 
population 1.843 8.149*** 0.167 1.730 8.327*** 0.213 2.359 8.204*** 0.148 
 (1.196) (3.385) (0.594) (1.148) (3.632) (0.858) (1.294) (3.505) (0.539) 
Ethnic 6.215 -2.028 -0.826 3.534 2.602 -0.026 2.223 2.920 0.057 
 (1.182) (-0.343) (-0.951) (0.692) (0.445) (-0.034) (0.407) (0.480) (0.071) 
Language -0.327 -3.638 0.113 1.050 -6.209 -0.319 1.151 -2.034 -0.006 
 (-0.083) (-0.807) (0.190) (0.272) (-1.348) (-0.564) (0.295) (-0.418) (-0.011) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
obs 72 72 71 72 72 71 69 69 68 
R2 0.40 0.58 0.52 0.42 0.61 0.57 0.42 0.61 0.58 
 
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions are estimated with regional dummies and robust standard errors (except 
otherwise noted). The set of regional dummies includes a fixed effect for East Asia (AsiaE), North America (NAm), Sub-Sahara Africa (SubAfr) and Asia and Middle 
Africa (AsiaMAfr). In Columns (1), (4) and (7) the dependent variable is the Capital Tax Rate data developed by Djankov et al. (2010). In Columns (2), (5) and (8) the 
dependent variables is the Labor Tax Rate data developed by Djankov et al. (2010). Finally, in Columns (3), (6) and (9) the dependent variable is the Ratio of labor to 
capital tax. In Columns (1) to (3) the Gini coefficient –before taxes and transfers- developed by Solt (2009) [denoted as GiniSolt_market] is employed as proxy of 
income inequality.  In Columns (4) to (6) the Gini coefficient –after taxes and transfers- developed by Solt (2009) [denoted as Gini_Solt] is employed as proxy of 
income inequality.  In Columns (7) to (9) the Gini coefficient developed by Deininger and Squire (1996) [denoted as Gini_DS] is employed as proxy of income 
inequality The *, ** and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
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Table2b: The effect of income inequality on the tax structure. Sensitivity Analysis. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Capital 
tax rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Ratio 
(labor to 
capital tax) 
Capital tax 
rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Ratio 
(labor to 
capital tax) 
Capital 
tax rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Ratio 
(labor to 
capital tax) 
Gini_Texas 0.513*** -0.423* -0.093*** 0.320** -0.490* -0.080*** 1.094* -1.774* -0.288*** 
 (3.494) (-1.958) (-3.786) (2.508) (-1.707) (-3.711) (1.738) (-1.836) (-2.594) 
gdp_percapita 0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001* -0.001 -0.001** 0.001* -0.001** -0.001** 
 (2.422) (-3.543) (-3.116) (1.698) (-1.527) (-2.238) (1.709) (-2.112) (-2.433) 
openness -0.038 0.077*** 0.008** -0.097*** 0.064* 0.006** -0.050 -0.016 0.002 
 (-1.585) (2.673) (2.148) (-2.635) (1.824) (2.359) (-1.008) (-0.219) (0.263) 
democracy 0.209 0.444* 0.065 0.359* 0.105 -0.013 0.398 0.234 0.035 
 (1.013) (1.839) (1.573) (1.682) (0.269) (-0.549) (1.567) (0.633) (0.656) 
legor_uk 0.610 -10.754*** -0.890*** -0.190 -10.113*** -0.636** -0.883 -6.806* -0.350 
 (0.304) (-4.396) (-3.274) (-0.059) (-3.537) (-2.435) (-0.324) (-1.788) (-0.920) 
Government spending -0.084 0.239* 0.014 -0.009 0.178 0.032* 0.103 -0.051 -0.036 
 (-0.974) (1.992) (0.827) (-0.071) (0.949) (1.673) (0.613) (-0.197) (-0.979) 
old 0.188 0.494 0.015 0.260 -0.008 -0.002 0.576* 0.116 -0.027 
 (0.749) (1.442) (0.420) (0.879) (-0.013) (-0.080) (1.935) (0.228) (-0.474) 
population 1.629 8.855*** 0.074 0.853 7.334*** 0.468 3.365 4.495 -0.532 
 (0.908) (3.739) (0.243) (0.454) (2.673) (1.334) (1.273) (1.147) (-1.061) 
Ethnic 0.734 1.674 -0.085 2.467 -1.695 -0.009 1.268 6.033 0.358 
 (0.164) (0.278) (-0.106) (0.664) (-0.273) (-0.021) (0.204) (0.876) (0.419) 
Language 0.018 -4.661 0.271 1.212 -0.633 -0.172 -1.598 1.459 0.995 
 (0.005) (-0.870) (0.402) (0.312) (-0.136) (-0.357) (-0.373) (0.265) (1.271) 
Regional Dummies No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
obs 67 67 67 67 67 67 66 66 66 
R2 0.40 0.57 0.48    0.34 0.37 0.18 
Hansen J       12.34 3.46 3.39 
       (0.1946) (0.9433) (0.9466) 
 
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions are estimated with regional dummies and robust standard errors (except 
otherwise noted). The set of regional dummies includes a fixed effect for East Asia (AsiaE), North America (NAm), Sub-Sahara Africa (SubAfr) and Asia and Middle 
Africa (AsiaMAfr). In Columns (1), (4) and (7) the dependent variable is the Capital Tax Rate data developed by Djankov et al. (2010). In Columns (2), (5) and (8) the 
dependent variables is the Labor Tax Rate data developed by Djankov et al. (2010). Finally, in Columns (3), (6) and (9) the dependent variable is the Ratio of labor to 
capital tax. In Columns (1) to (3) the regressions are estimated without regional dummies.  In Columns (4) to (6) the regressions are estimated with robust regression 
analysis using the MM- estimator (Yohai et al., 1987).  In Columns (7) to (9) the regressions are estimated with two-stage least squares (2SLS). The *, ** and *** marks 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
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Table3: The effect of Democracy on the nexus between income inequality and tax structure.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Capital 
tax rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Ratio (labor 
to capital 
tax) 
Capital tax 
rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Ratio (labor 
to capital 
tax) 
Capital 
tax rate 
 
Labor  tax 
rate 
 
Ratio 
(labor to 
capital tax) 
Gini_Texas 0.395*** -0.469 -0.093*** 0.475*** -0.559** -0.111*** 0.441*** -0.589*** -0.106*** 
 (2.762) (-1.546) (-3.000) (2.924) (-2.255) (-3.670) (2.852) (-2.776) (-3.985) 
democracy 0.303 0.259 0.054       
 (1.214) (0.814) (0.987)       
Gini_Texas_dif*Democracy_dif 0.021 0.007 0.001       
 (0.986) (0.211) (0.122)       
Rule_Law    -0.473 0.433 -0.043    
    (-0.334) (0.153) (-0.148)    
Gini_Texas_dif *Rule_Law_dif    -0.170 0.250 0.047    
    (-0.865) (0.911) (1.305)    
Voice_Accountability        0.106 -0.381 0.181 
       (0.058) (-0.160) (0.531) 
Gini_Texas_dif * 
Voice_Accountability_dif       -0.059 0.325 0.040 
       (-0.348) (1.419) (1.297) 
gdp_percapita 0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 0.001*** -0.001 -0.001* 0.001*** -0.001 -0.001** 
 (2.901) (-2.116) (-2.622) (3.158) (-1.070) (-1.679) (3.378) (-0.892) (-2.100) 
openness -0.048* 0.077** 0.010** -0.059*** 0.064** 0.007** -0.059** 0.057** 0.008* 
 (-1.997) (2.504) (2.154) (-2.860) (2.580) (2.156) (-2.546) (2.166) (1.946) 
legor_uk 1.203 -9.584*** -0.875*** 1.477 -9.109*** -0.688*** 1.527 -9.210*** -0.727*** 
 (0.539) (-3.716) (-2.784) (0.728) (-3.633) (-2.784) (0.755) (-3.741) (-2.961) 
Government spending -0.083 0.172 0.008 -0.080 0.159 0.011 -0.098 0.209 0.011 
 (-0.840) (1.237) (0.415) (-0.803) (1.131) (0.575) (-0.924) (1.416) (0.531) 
old 0.389 0.308 0.019 0.196 0.310 0.011 0.259 0.279 0.020 
 (1.123) (0.672) (0.355) (0.570) (0.710) (0.232) (0.719) (0.641) (0.395) 
population 1.333 8.451*** 0.036 1.158 7.418*** -0.194 1.096 6.798*** -0.095 
 (0.723) (3.290) (0.108) (0.608) (2.907) (-0.515) (0.578) (2.715) (-0.281) 
Ethnic 4.781 -0.148 -0.684 5.387 0.341 -0.631 5.622 -0.262 -0.560 
 (1.024) (-0.024) (-0.702) (1.124) (0.060) (-0.781) (1.174) (-0.045) (-0.691) 
Language 0.271 -2.525 0.526 -0.143 -1.398 0.709 0.057 -0.738 0.661 
 (0.061) (-0.507) (0.714) (-0.034) (-0.314) (1.040) (0.013) (-0.170) (0.985) 
Reg. Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
obs 67 67 67 68 68 68 68 68 68 
R2 0.47 0.60 0.51 0.46 0.60 0.52 0.45 0.61 0.51 
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Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and t-statistics in parentheses. All regressions are estimated with regional dummies and robust standard errors (except otherwise 
noted). The set of regional dummies includes a fixed effect for East Asia (AsiaE), North America (NAm), Sub-Sahara Africa (SubAfr) and Asia and Middle Africa (AsiaMAfr). In 
Columns (1), (4) and (7) the dependent variable is the Capital Tax Rate data developed by Djankov et al. (2010). In Columns (2), (5) and (8) the dependent variables is the Labor 
Tax Rate data developed by Djankov et al. (2010). In Columns (3), (6) and (9) the dependent variable is the Ratio of labor to capital tax.  In Columns (1) to (3) we have introduced 
the interaction term Gini_Texas_dif* Democracy_dif which consists of the Gini_Texas_dif that is the mean-centered of the Gini_Texas and the Democracy_dif which is the mean-
centered of the democracy measure developed by Polity IV (2004) database with higher values denoting more democratic regimes. In Columns (4) to (6) we have the interaction 
term Gini_Texas_dif* Rule_Law_dif where the Rule_Law_dif is the mean-centered measure of the “Rule of Law” measure developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) with higher values 
denoting more accountable regime. Finally, in Columns (7) to (9) we have introduced the multiplicative variable Gini_Texas_dif*Accountability_dif  where Accountability_dif is the 
mean-centered measures of “Voice and Accountability” variable developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) with higher values denoting more accountable regime. The *, ** and *** 
marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
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